

# IP-based Emergency Services

Challenges to emergency communications services in the context of the Internet and the multinational European environment

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# REGULATORY VIEWS

## FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski

August 2011

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- *"It's hard to imagine that airlines can send text messages if your flight is delayed, but you can't send a text message to 911 in an emergency."*
- He continues, *"The unfortunate truth is that the capability of our emergency-response communications has not kept pace with commercial innovation, has not kept pace with what ordinary people now do every day with communications devices."*

## EC VPs Neelie Kroes & Siim Kallas

### February 2012

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- They decided to work together to ensure every European can access a 112 smartphone app, in their own language.
- This announcement was made on the European 112 day when surveys revealed that "74 % of Europeans don't know what emergency number to call when traveling in the EU".

# EMERGENCY SERVICES AUTHORITIES

# Cost Reduction leads to Consolidation


## Example Finland



**15**



**6**



~160 PSAPs in 1970.  
At the moment 14.

# Requirements From Emergency Services Authorities

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## Requirements


1. Standards based approach for
  1. Location conveyance (Q8: 100% yes)
  2. PSAP – interface (Q5: 95% yes)
  3. Call Routing (Q9: 72% yes)
2. Multi-Media communications with citizens
  - Q4 : 97% yes
3. Emergency Services Interoperability
  - Q11: Avg. 3,65  
(1 = less important; 5 = very important)

The survey, distributed in Europe in Aug. 2011, can be found here:

[http://www.eena.org/ressource/static/files/2011\\_09\\_08\\_ng112opreqsurvey\\_v1.2.pdf](http://www.eena.org/ressource/static/files/2011_09_08_ng112opreqsurvey_v1.2.pdf)

# TECHNICAL COMMUNITY





**Technical Standards**  
 from IETF, 3GPP, NENA, EENA



# CHALLENGES

# Security Concerns

- We are building on top of the regular IP-based infrastructure and SIP as a communication mechanism.
- Consequently vulnerabilities are inherited as well.
- Resource consumption at the PSAP based on false calls is one biggest security threats:
- Example: swatting
- There are many variants of false calls, see [EENA publication](#).
- Some countries have very high numbers of false calls (>50% of the total # of calls are false calls).

# The Attribution Problem\*

- Attribution ...
- Requires to identify the agent responsible for the action
- Determining the **identity or location of an attacker** (or an attacker's intermediary).
- Four aspects of attribution:
- Types: if users are expected to be identified in some way, what is the source of that identity? What can we conclude about the utility of different sorts of identity?
- Timing: what are the different roles of attribution before, during and after an event?
- Investigators: how might different parties exploit attribution as a part of deterrence?
- Jurisdiction: what are the variations that we can expect across different jurisdictions? How might this influence our choices in mechanism design?

(\* ) D. Clark, S. Landau, "Untangling Attribution", in *Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring CyberAttacks: Informing Strategies and Developing*, 2010.

# The *untrusted* End Host

- In spring 2011 the European Commission issued [Mandate 493](#) calling for new standardization work on caller location for emergency services.
  - The impression of the EC was that the lack of IP-based location is caused by the lack of European standards in that space.
  - A European SDO had to be found to execute this need for new standards. ETSI was happy to take on this task.
- Note: This is different from the recent attempt of the EC to improve location accuracy in Europe.
- The ETSI M493 group was formed and it operates under the assumption that information from the end host cannot be trusted (including location).
  - Changes require additional infrastructure support (e.g., Location Servers in every access network).
  - Transition path to new architecture is very complex.
  - Participating stakeholders do not necessarily represent the Internet eco-system.


# The *missing* Business Model

- Location is considered to be best provided by the access network provider (ANP).
- ANPs (in Europe) did not want to invest in location servers offering high quality positioning techniques.
- Commercial location based services have not worked out well for operators.
- Emergency services will not bring them new income either (based on constraints imposed on EC regulation).
- ANPs are fine with offering emergency services for their own IMS-style services.
- Interest to provide any support for OTT providers is “limited”.
- Additional challenges created by regulation in Europe.
- uses E.164 numbering to decide whether an VoIP provider is subject to regulatory requirements.
- Law does not distinguish between access provider & application provider

# Conclusion

- Emergency services: a mix of technology, business models, regulation, and user expectations.
- Many stakeholders with different incentives.
- Emergency services heavily impacted by the underlying communication infrastructure.
- The cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet communication makes agreements difficult.
  - Emergency services was previously a purely national matter. The contact persons of regulators now change.
- Security concerns may prevent re-use of innovative application and may impact extensibility.
- Allowing users to initiate emergency communication from any device, from any environment with rich multimedia will still take a long time.

# Book Announcement



- Edited by Hannes Tschofenig & Henning Schulzrinne
- Long list of contributors from the emergency services community.
- More info: <http://ip-emergency.net/>