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Hello, friends and colleagues.

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I chose this as the title
for my talk thinking

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of the following metaphor.

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500 million years ago
photosynthetic bacteria

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in the ocean gradually
changed our atmosphere to one

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of oxygen. And I said, oh, what
must have happened visually?

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It must have been
the case that we

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went from a murky,
obscure atmosphere to one

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where you could see
clearly for a long distance

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like we can today-- in most
places besides Los Angeles.

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I don't think that
was quite the case.

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But I think it's a good
metaphor for what's

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happening with the information
revolution we have now.

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We can access information
easily much further away

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than we could before.

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And this transition of
the atmosphere, I think,

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is sort of a nice metaphor to--
even though it's not accurate,

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maybe not on this planet.

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Keep it in mind.

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Background reading
assignment for all of you--

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if you haven't seen Enemy
of the State, go see it.

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It's a wonderful movie.

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There's a lot of discussion
of privacy and illustration

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of what current
technology is capable of.

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One of the corrupt NSA employees
there has this nice quote.

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"Privacy is an illusion.

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We haven't had any for 20 years.

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All that's left is
what's in your head.

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And maybe that's enough."

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I don't think that's true.

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I don't agree with that.

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I don't think it's enough.

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But we need to work in order
to preserve our privacy.

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Go see the movie.

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What's happening?

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The digital revolution reverses
many of the default assumptions

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we've had.

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What was once hard to copy
is now trivial to duplicate.

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And this is having grave
and tremendous consequences

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for the publishing industry.

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The once-familiar friend is
now hard to identify online.

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You get some email
allegedly from your friend.

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Is it really from your friend?

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You're no longer so sure.

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What is once forgotten
is now stored forever.

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You can look up everything
you've ever posted

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on a newsgroup in Deja News.

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And what was once private is
now public more and more so

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as time goes on.

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And that's the issue
I'm addressing today.

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How do we visualize
this problem?

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I think trying to
imagine a world where

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we have 100 to 1,000 times
as much information stored

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about everything we do
is the place to start.

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So imagine your personal website
now has 1 million automatically

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generated web pages
in it documenting

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every aspect of your life.

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[INAUDIBLE] [? Bush ?] sort
of had a image like that.

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And Dave Carter talked about
this kind of thing earlier,

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too.

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Every artifact has a website.

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Everything that's
ever been made,

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there's a little website,
a web page describing it.

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Every transaction
has a web page.

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Video cameras have
plummeted in price

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to $19.95, sold
on late night TV.

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And they're now pervasive.

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They're all over the place.

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And video feeds are
coming from everywhere.

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You're always on camera.

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And the computers track where
you are and what you're doing.

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So here's a website
for my toothbrush.

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It gives the owner,
who it was made by,

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et cetera, et cetera,
transaction information

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to current location.

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Actually, this
website is supported

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by the computer that's
in the toothbrush itself,

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of course, because everything
has got a computer in it.

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That's one kind of information,
personal information which

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you may want to control,
personal artifacts.

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Transaction information--
here's a transaction web page

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saying the purchase
of that toothbrush.

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So this might be
information that's

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maintained both by me
and by the manufacturer

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that I bought it from or the
store that I bought it from,

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and other kinds of
information about it.

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This is the kind of information
known by two parties

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that the European
Privacy Directive is

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so good at addressing.

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What are the companies allowed
to preserve about various kinds

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of transaction information?

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You have, on the one hand
personal information.

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Here's transaction information.

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And then we've got, maybe,
this video kind of information.

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Here's the bathroom video cam
saying where that toothbrush

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is, sitting on the sink.

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But you can imagine that
these video cameras are not

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just in private homes, but
they're going to be all around.

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We've seen this in
the news already.

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You'll have cameras
on the streets.

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And people that can be
monitored very easily.

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So, privacy is the issue.

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Great study of privacy by
Supreme Court Justices Brandeis

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and Warren in 1890--

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"Privacy is the right
to be let alone."

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And another wonderful quote--

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"Numerous mechanical
devices threaten

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to make good the
prediction that was once

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whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the housetops."

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And if a webcam in
your bathroom doesn't

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count as that kind
of a thing, I mean,

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that's really exactly what
they're talking about.

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More recently,
we've had justices

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talking about
technology that breaches

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a reasonable
expectation of privacy

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violates the Fourth Amendment,
requires a court order.

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So privacy is something that
comes into the law a lot.

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We need to define
legally what we

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mean by privacy, what a
reasonable expectation

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of privacy is these days.

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I mean, that's getting
harder and harder to define.

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But we need to work
on the technology

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to enforce and enable a
reasonable level of privacy,

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a reasonable
expectation of privacy.

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So privacy is no
longer the default.

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You should assume
everything is public

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unless you've made some
effort to make it otherwise.

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We need to work to define what
security policies we want,

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who's allowed to see what, and
then work to achieve those.

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We don't have the natural
difficulty of accessing

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information anymore.

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What's in a file cabinet
in some secretary's office,

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hard to access, has
now become a website

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on the same computer in the
same secretary's office.

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We need to establish artificial
barriers where there were once

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natural barriers.

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So you have to decide.

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Before it was
default to private.

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Now you have to decide
what should remain private.

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Who should know
where you are now?

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The kind of scenario that Hari
Balakrishnan gave earlier,

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where you can find our
colleague in Greece, was great.

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But if you've got a
stalker after you,

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you may not want your
current location to be known.

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Who should know what you are
doing now or saying or reading?

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We can implement lots
of different mechanisms

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to enforce policies
one way or the other,

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but you've got to say
now what should be public

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and to what extent
should it be private?

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Who should know what
you have purchased,

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when and where, where you
bought your last toothbrush?

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Who should know your
medical history?

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Clearly, that
needs to be shared.

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We need to think hard about
the right kinds of access

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policies for this information.

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Who should know your
voting record, something

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that needs to be a bit private
or whom you communicated with

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or who you are?

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We've got a panel coming
up an anonymity that

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talks about this issue.

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First director of LCS,
Bob Fano, wrote an article

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in Scientific American back in
1967 which remains true today.

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"You should have
the right to decide

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what is to remain private."

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I think that's an important
fundamental principle

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of privacy.

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But that means you've got to
put the work in and decide

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and think about these questions.

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In oxygen, we imagine
that the technology

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for achieving the
goals, once you've

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decided what you want
to do, will be based

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on public-key cryptography.

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That's really the only
workable technology,

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the only flexible authentication
and encryption technology

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in a large-scale system.

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Each individual or device
will have public keys.

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You might have more than one if
you're acting in several roles.

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You might have a
public key for yourself

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as a private individual
and another key

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for your business role.

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We may get to the point where
messages that are not digitally

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signed or authenticated
cryptographically

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are merely considered
trash and thrown away.

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This junk that comes in
over the email from who

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knows whom, we just toss out.

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Your internet
identity really then

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becomes tied to your
public key that verifies

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the signatures you create.

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And so the public key,
being in some way, something

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you own and control,
it's almost the other way

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around-- the public key
defines the identity.

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And you're sort of the
physical appendage to it.

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So the identities are to become
the public keys in cyberspace.

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Freshly-made public keys
can be used as pseudonyms.

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You can make up a new identity
by creating a new public key

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and starting to
sign things with it.

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And that starts creating
a record of statements

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made by that new entity.

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No one knows you, as
a physical person,

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controls that pseudonym.

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And using the
pseudonym, of course,

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doesn't allow other people
to sign for that pseudonym.

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That's the nice thing about
public-key cryptography,

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is you can sign things without
giving other people the ability

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to sign for you.

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And no one can link
your pseudonyms.

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Only you can transfer
information between them.

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There's actually
several students

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at MIT currently working
on pseudonym systems

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and the wonderful things
you can do with them

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and developing
fantastic mathematics

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for these kinds of things
that I don't have the time

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to get into.

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But it's a good research area.

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So you've got the keys there.

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Then access control
needs to be specified.

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Somehow, you need
to put on a web page

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or on a piece of
information to tag it

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with the public keys that
are allowed to sign requests

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for access to that information.

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So the key is, in some
sense, their access

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to the information.

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So each information object
will have an access control

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list saying which
keys are allowed

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to read it or work with it.

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We have some ongoing research
in the lab for computer science

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on public-key infrastructures
addressing precisely

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that question of ease of use.

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The [? SPOOKY, ?]
[? SUDSY ?] systems,

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if you know the acronyms, are
addressed towards this question

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of trying to make that easy
because once you answer these

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questions of who's allowed
to know where you are,

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you've got to somehow
convey that to the computer

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in an intelligible way.

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And that needs to be easy to
do if we're all gonna do it.

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Part of the [? SUDSY ?]
system that we've developed

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has a distributive naming system
where every key, in essence,

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becomes its own naming authority
and creates certificates

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defining groups and
subgroups of names

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to be used in your security
policy specifications.

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And finally, a
couple of issues that

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come up in oxygen--
intentional naming

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was mentioned by
Hari Balakrishnan.

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There's real security
concerns I have about that

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if it's not done carefully.

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But I think we can handle it.

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When a device says, I'm
this kind of a device,

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why should you believe it?

254
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It says, I'm a
fiber optic cable.

255
00:09:42,880 --> 00:09:44,223
It's broadcasting its service.

256
00:09:44,223 --> 00:09:46,390
If you're trying to get
into a system and attack it,

257
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you'll have people spoofing
things and so on, too.

258
00:09:48,473 --> 00:09:50,223
So we have the same
issue that actually we

259
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have now with applets.

260
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When you download an applet, why
should you trust it or believe

261
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that it's--

262
00:09:54,222 --> 00:09:55,450
oh, it's digitally signed.

263
00:09:55,450 --> 00:09:57,880
So these things will probably
be digitally signed as well.

264
00:09:57,880 --> 00:10:00,620


265
00:10:00,620 --> 00:10:03,190
And finally, we have
in oxygen the question

266
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of setting up a
collab region that

267
00:10:04,642 --> 00:10:06,100
was talked about
in Hari's example,

268
00:10:06,100 --> 00:10:07,600
again, of getting
a group of people

269
00:10:07,600 --> 00:10:09,280
together and setting
up a private--

270
00:10:09,280 --> 00:10:11,260
essentially a virtual
private network

271
00:10:11,260 --> 00:10:13,480
between them with
their names being

272
00:10:13,480 --> 00:10:15,580
used to identify
their keys, and then

273
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the keys being used to set
up a symmetric key that's

274
00:10:18,130 --> 00:10:21,290
used to encrypt all of the
communication between them.

275
00:10:21,290 --> 00:10:23,650
So a collab region, as a
fundamental notion of oxygen

276
00:10:23,650 --> 00:10:25,150
here, is actually
something we think

277
00:10:25,150 --> 00:10:26,870
we know how to do pretty well.

278
00:10:26,870 --> 00:10:28,780
This is one of the
easier problems to solve.

279
00:10:28,780 --> 00:10:30,447
The harder ones are
privacy and allowing

280
00:10:30,447 --> 00:10:33,168
the support for the kind
of access control you want.

281
00:10:33,168 --> 00:10:35,710
So setting up a collab region--
you still sign your messages,

282
00:10:35,710 --> 00:10:37,710
encrypt them with the
group key, and so on, too.

283
00:10:37,710 --> 00:10:40,252
For large groups, we have
more elaborate things.

284
00:10:40,252 --> 00:10:41,710
So we're moving
into this new world

285
00:10:41,710 --> 00:10:43,808
where things have changed.

286
00:10:43,808 --> 00:10:45,100
All the defaults are different.

287
00:10:45,100 --> 00:10:46,120
We have to work.

288
00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:47,170
And we're getting
a lot of benefit

289
00:10:47,170 --> 00:10:48,220
out of this digital revolution.

290
00:10:48,220 --> 00:10:49,303
Things are easy to access.

291
00:10:49,303 --> 00:10:50,562
But we pay a price.

292
00:10:50,562 --> 00:10:52,270
And the price is that
we have to work now

293
00:10:52,270 --> 00:10:54,430
to say what it is that
shouldn't, all of a sudden,

294
00:10:54,430 --> 00:10:55,390
become easy.

295
00:10:55,390 --> 00:10:57,430
Where should we set up
the artificial barriers,

296
00:10:57,430 --> 00:10:59,680
the cryptographic barriers,
or other kinds of barriers

297
00:10:59,680 --> 00:11:01,503
against the access
of information

298
00:11:01,503 --> 00:11:02,920
in order to preserve
for ourselves

299
00:11:02,920 --> 00:11:04,588
the privacy we need to have?

300
00:11:04,588 --> 00:11:05,380
So I'll stop there.

301
00:11:05,380 --> 00:11:06,755
And thank you for
your attention.

302
00:11:06,755 --> 00:11:17,120


303
00:11:17,120 --> 00:11:20,030
Well, privacy and
anonymity are, as the point

304
00:11:20,030 --> 00:11:22,460
has just been made, not
quite the same thing.

305
00:11:22,460 --> 00:11:23,960
But it's certainly
a good lead-in.

306
00:11:23,960 --> 00:11:26,960
We're going to soon
discuss, in a panel

307
00:11:26,960 --> 00:11:30,620
right here, whether
the anonymous remailer

308
00:11:30,620 --> 00:11:32,580
that LCS maintains
on the internet,

309
00:11:32,580 --> 00:11:36,090
whether that remailer
should be shut down.

310
00:11:36,090 --> 00:11:40,130
So please be sure to come back
for that panel discussion.

311
00:11:40,130 --> 00:11:42,800
We're going to take a
little break just before it.

312
00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:44,840
Why don't you all
please come back here

313
00:11:44,840 --> 00:11:46,460
by 5 minutes after 4:00?

314
00:11:46,460 --> 00:11:47,780
That'd be a 15-minute break.

315
00:11:47,780 --> 00:11:49,780
Thanks very much.

316
00:11:49,780 --> 00:12:20,344